3. The loan must be originated by insured depositories with total assets less than $10 billion 3 but only if the mortgage is held in portfolio.
Mortgages that meet the QM definition are presumed to comply with ability to repay in one of two ways. First-lien mortgages with an annual percentage rate no more than 150 basis points above the Average Prime Offered Rate 4 (APOR) receive an unrebuttable presumption of compliance, a so-called safe harbor. This offers lenders the highest level of legal protection. All other QM loans receive a presumption of compliance that can be rebutted in litigation by showing that the lender failed to verify borrower ability to repay.
The CFPB's QM rule created an exemption from the 43 percent DTI cap for mortgages eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. This exemption is commonly known as the "GSE patch." Loans insured by the FHA, VA, or USDA are governed by separate QM rules developed and implemented by each of these agencies. 5 The QM rules finalized by these three agencies have no maximum DTI requirement. The GSE patch is a temporary measure that is set to expire on January 10, 2021, or on the day the GSEs exit Federal Housing Finance Agency conservatorship, whichever occurs first. The FHA, VA, and USDA QM rules are permanent.
High-DTI Lending under QM
Data show that a considerable share of federally insured or GSE-guaranteed qualified mortgages over the past several years had DTI ratios over 43 percent. Table 1 shows the share of purchase mortgages with DTI ratios over 43 percent by origination year. About one in five GSE-backed mortgages originated in 2017 had a DTI ratio over 43 percent, and one in two FHA or VA mortgages had a DTI ratio over 43 percent. In comparison, the share of these mortgages in bank portfolios, which consists largely of highquality jumbo loans, averaged about 15 percent from 2013 to 2018 but has risen to about 20 percent. To appreciate how significant these numbers are, it is worth looking at the market for loans that fall outside the QM definition. Although reliable data on "non-QM" lending volumes are difficult to come by, estimates of originations range from $10 to $20 billion a year 6 for 2017, a drop in the bucket compared with the $1.8 trillion in total originations. The non-QM market is small because most lenders are wary of taking on the risk that a borrower in default will sue, citing lender failure to verify ability to repay. The CFPB can preserve the GSE patch one of two ways. The first is a simple extension, leaving the rules that govern qualified mortgages as is. The CFPB would essentially extend the patch to a new expiration date or to the GSEs' exit from conservatorship, whichever comes first. Absent GSE reform, this option would force the CFPB to revisit the patch before the new expiration date. Or the CFPB could drop the sunset date and tie patch expiration to the GSEs' exit from conservatorship.
The CFPB could also go further and expand the GSE patch modestly. All elements of QM would remain in place, but the patch would be expanded to cover mortgages within the risk tolerances of the GSEs' automatic underwriting systems (AUS), even if they are GSE-ineligible for other reasons. For instance, a loan that is ineligible because its size exceeds the conventional loan limit but is otherwise within the AUS risk profile would be deemed a qualified mortgage. For the most part, this expansion would award QM status to jumbo loans with DTI ratios over 43 percent held in bank portfolios. Jumbo loans tend to be high-quality mortgages but are agency-ineligible because their size exceeds the conforming limit.
This option's practical benefit is modest, though: there is ample credit available at the jumbo end of the market. Loans to low-and moderate-income borrowers and first-time homebuyers-for whom access to credit remains tight-are less likely to fall within AUS risk tolerances and thus are less likely to be deemed qualified mortgages under this patch expansion.
We believe this option will yield only modest benefits, and most of them will flow to the high end of the market, where credit availability is not constrained. Additionally, the patch, even if extended, is a temporary solution that will eventually need revisiting. Considering this, we recommend the CFPB consider a more permanent alternative. The next approach, option 2, would constitute a major change to QM but would meaningfully improve credit availability.
Option 2: Drop the DTI Cap and GSE Patch from the QM Definition
We recommend a QM safe harbor standard based on a loan's overall riskiness as opposed to the DTI ratio, or who insures or guarantees the mortgage. Under this structure, the 43 percent DTI cap and GSE patch would be dropped from the CFPB's QM rule. Restrictions on risky products, loan terms, and points and fees would remain unchanged, as would the statutory exemption for portfolio lenders with less than $10 billion in assets. With no DTI cap or the patch, this framework would provide safe harbor status to first-lien mortgages as long as their annual percentage rate is no more than 150 basis points over the APOR. The underlying premise is that loans priced under the 150 basis point rate-spread threshold would be less risky than loans priced above this threshold. A rate spread-based QM regime offers several advantages:
Mortgage rates reflect credit risk more holistically than DTI ratios. The DTI ratio is one of several factors affecting borrower creditworthiness and ability to repay. But it is not a good predictor of default because it is often poorly measured. 7 Consider the following examples: Families who could qualify for a mortgage using only one spouse's earnings would not have the incentive to document and report the second income on their loan application. In this case, household income would be understated, and the DTI ratio would be overstated. As another example, debt owed to individuals, family members, or friends (e.g., money borrowed from parents for college or a car purchase) is not recorded, does not show up in a credit report, and is likely underreported. This would tend to understate the borrower's true debt burden and DTI ratio. In both examples, the ability to repay would be inaccurately measured, and there would be no way for a loan officer to know the household's total debt burden or income. Other situations that can distort the DTI ratio include undisclosed income from a second, part-time, or seasonal job; rental or room-share income; and debt taken on shortly after the loan closes.
The annual percentage rate, however, considers a wider set of borrower, property, and loan characteristics, including the DTI ratio, resulting in a more holistic measure. Evidence from default rates on historical GSE originations shows the limitations of DTI ratios in predicting default risk ( A rate-spread framework would create a more level playing field. Moving to a regime that takes a holistic view of credit risk would also level the playing field between the private sector and the agencies, potentially encouraging more lending outside federally backed channels. The safe harbor protection lenders currently receive for agency-eligible mortgages substantially reduces litigation risk relative to agency-ineligible loans with similar risk profiles. Assume two loans with the same DTI ratio over 43 percent and same probability of default. One is agency-eligible and is deemed a qualified mortgage, and the other is not agency-eligible and is not deemed a qualified mortgage even though it is no riskier.
Because there is no way to get safe harbor protection for the second loan, the lender will either price for the added litigation risk or choose not to originate the loan. Either way, this does not serve the borrower well. Under our recommendation, the lender would be able to get safe harbor for both loans as long as the annual percentage rates are within 150 basis points of the APOR.
The standard would facilitate innovation. Encouraging lenders to originate and hold more high-DTI loans would provide an incentive for them to seek ways to better serve the market, such as by using new innovative methods to verify ability to repay, especially as borrower and household characteristics and work arrangements evolve. Recent technology innovations have automated income and asset verification and reduced the need for paper-based manual entries, which has improved the robustness of loan underwriting and cut down approval times. Such incremental accuracy matters because it can make a difference in a marginal borrower being approved for or denied a loan. The prospect of earning greater profits by holding high-DTI QM loans in portfolio could encourage lenders to make investments that are needed to serve future homebuyers, who are more likely to have nontraditional incomes and heavy student loan burdens than prior generations.
There is ample precedent for a rate-spread test. History shows there is ample precedent for the rate-spread regime. The trigger for restrictions and additional disclosure requirements under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act is based on an APOR test. Similarly, the requirement to set up escrows for property taxes and insurance is based on a rate spread. There are a couple of downsides to a rate spread-based QM. First, it assumes the market would always price credit risk accurately, which is hardly assured. Rate spreads would be lowest when real estate prices have increased rapidly and are expected to continue to do so, such as during economic booms. Credit is also likely to be more loosely available during such periods, increasing the risk of borrowers getting overextended. Mispricing could also occur because of perceptions that certain borrowers are riskier or less risky. Finally, a rate spread-based regime could give lenders an incentive to price mortgages just below the threshold to qualify for the safe harbor. 
Conclusion
The upcoming GSE patch expiration is an opportunity for the CFPB to modify the patch to make it work better. We believe replacing the current DTI-heavy framework with one that captures risk more holistically (option 2, rate spread) would more effectively expand access while mitigating credit risk.
Option 2 would also create a more level playing field between the agency-backed and purely private capital-backed channels, potentially providing incentives for more private lending. Option 1 (preserving the patch) would at best have marginal benefit and would leave unresolved the uncertainty surrounding the patch's future. Option 3 (letting the patch expire) would largely redirect high-DTI lending from one government-backed channel (the GSEs) to another (the FHA).
We recognize there might be other options for addressing patch expiration, and we hope this brief is a useful starting point for a robust debate.
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